BONA SAWA

ELITES, ETHNO-REGIONAL COMPETITION IN CAMEROON,

AND THE SOUTHWEST ELITES ASSOCIATION (SWELA), 1991–

1997

Walter G. NKWI

in most African countries south of the Sahara after 1990. The reasons were

to retain power and ethno-regional elites gaining access to the state and its resources.

Cameroon was not an exception. This paper critically explores how the Southwest

Elites Association (SWELA) and its historical antecedent fit into ethno-regional

politics and the invention of ethnicity in Cameroon. It also attempts to show how the

government has used SWELA, and how SWELA, in turn, used the government to

achieve its own aims.

Key Words: Competition; Elites; Ethnicity; Forest zone; Grasslands.

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES

According to Searl (1995), the mind imagines ideas, institutions, and materials,

and makes them effective in daily operations. He argues that collective

consciousness and compromise can construct certain beliefs that may later

become enduring and effective, so much so that, in time, they could be seen

as natural. The idea of social identity conforms to and confirms Searl’s theory.

Social identities, whether manifested in class groupings, gender, or ethnic classifications,

are potential targets for conflict and violence. Ethnicity, in particular,

plays a significant role in the prevailing crisis of development facing Africa

today. In Cameroon, the focus of this paper, colonial and post-colonial periods

produced ethnic groupings, which gave rise to what will be referred to in

this paper as elites, or ethnic elites. The creation of social identities, and giving

them substance, has given rise to ethnic regions. This paper defends the position

that elites have been at the center of the effort to manipulate ethnic diversity

in Cameroon, a phenomenon begun by the colonial regimes that has been

developed by post-colonial elites (political and traditional) for their own selfinterested

ends. Throughout the course of this manipulation, the regime in

power has used ethnic associations to maintain power.

In 1990, many parts of Africa south of the Sahara embraced a new political

dynamic. There was an unprecedented drive towards political and economic liberalization,

including threats to evict most African dictators, sparked by a general

call for democratization and the consequent rebirth of multi-party politics.

Political kleptocrats responded by engendering and intensifying the struggle over

belonging and forms of exclusion among their citizens. Some were branded

“natives,” while others were called “strangers”, even if they were citizens of

the same country. Although this undermined the very notion of national citizenship,

which most regimes in Africa had upheld in the early 1960s and 1970s,

using unity as a precondition for nation building (Geschiere, 2004), these same

authoritarian regimes began encouraging conflict between indigenous groups and

strangers to remain in power. In Cameroon in particular, the ruling government

since 1990, under Paul Biya, has placed additional emphasis on ethnicity, making

use of political and traditional elites. This effort was born out of a neopatrimonialistic

and clientelistic system in which appointments were made based

on one’s relation to the government rather than on merit and ability. In this

way, it became fashionable to use ethnic associations to retain the government

in power.

The ethnic associations in Cameroon included the Southwest Elite Association

(SWELA); the Northwest Elite Association (NOWELA); the elites of the Grand

North representing the interests of the three northern provinces of Adamawa,

North, and Far North; Essigan, representing the Beti and Bulu heterogeneous

groups of the Center Province; SAWA, representing the interests of the littoral

people; and LAAKAM of the Bamilekes of the West Province. In some of

these provinces, there were associations of traditional rulers, such as the Southwest

Chiefs Conference (SWECC) from the Southwest Province and the Northwest

Chiefs Conference (NOWECC) from the Northwest Province. In the course

of establishing these groups, the government appointed proxies and surrogates to

important positions, and funneled money to them, while the masses were struggling

with poverty to a large extent (Bayart, 1973; Korvenonja, 1993).

This practice gave rise to “ethnic jingoism, brazen provocation and the formation

of ethnic militias” (Fochingong, 2004). In the Southwest Province (see

Figs. 1 & 2), the focus of this paper, the non-indigenous population, especially

those from the Northwest and Western Provinces were frequently and repeatedly

reminded that they were strangers, “settlers,” or “come-no-goes” (translated

from the Pidgin English version and referring to a difficult-to-cure disease that

leads to scabbing) (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands, 1998). Near election time, the citizens

would be reminded by the political elite (ministers, directors of parastatals,

governors, and divisional officers) that they should go to their villages of origin

to register and vote.

Amongst the multifarious elite associations, this paper focuses on SWELA,

a brief description of which would help delineate it as a context. For example,

it has a unique ecology and geology, the most obvious feature of which is

Mt. Cameroon, a volcano that towers more than 4,000 meters above the coast;

it is also one of the most populous provinces in Cameroon, with a large plantation

complex and large-scale immigration. This high population density has

not only led to pressures on arable land but has also sparked fierce resentment

among groups that consider themselves indigenous toward so-called strangers

(Geschiere, 2004). A large proportion of the more than 300 ethnic groups in

Cameroon live in this province (Breton, 1983).

In the wake of political pluralism in 1990, the political elites of this province,

in an attempt to frustrate the ambitions and will of strangers who opposed

the status quo, formed an association, SWELA, in 1991, which they described

as apolitical but which had political underpinnings. As a direct consequence,

a new political vocabulary emerged. In local parlance (Pidgin), the immigrant

laborers and their children and grandchildren were often referred to as settlers,

strangers, and come-no-goes. The 1996 constitution did not help matters,

as it made official a clause that questioned citizenship and minority rights in

major city councils in Cameroon. According to this constitutional proviso, the

state was empowered “to ensure the protection of minorities and reserve the

rights of indigenous populations.” It goes further, requiring that chairmen of

the regional councils be indigenes. Although the protection of minorities (i.e.,

endangered minorities such as pygmies) was upheld by the United Nations, the

Cameroon political elite twisted its interpretation. According to the government,

minorities became indigenes/natives who were at risk of becoming extinct. This

raised the critical question of who was a minority and who could be classified

as indigenous with protected rights in a country with more than 300 ethnic

groups (Breton, 1983). Nonetheless, Presidential Decree No. 96/031 appointed

indigenes as government delegates in 10 metropolitan areas in which the Social

Democratic Party (SDF), the main opposition party, won the elections. This was

an attempt to put a check in place on the hegemony of non-natives in these

cities.

Although this was not particular to the Southwest Province, it seems to have

had the big effect in this region. For one thing, it is peculiar to the Southwest

Province to hear people called either indigenous (“sons of the soil”) or settlers

(non-natives). In addition, the governor of the province, Peter Oben Ashu, is the

only governor of 10 provincial governors in Cameroon who issued residence

permits to settlers before they could vote during the legislative elections of 17

May 1997, thereby disenfranchising a good number of non-natives (Yenshu,

1998). This maneuver was intended to favor the ruling party, the Cameroon

Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM). During in this time, SWELA was

born, but in the terms used by elite literature, it suffered a rumpus in 1993, at

which point it segmented into its component parts. By 1997, there were three

factions of SWELA, guided by inherent differences among elite groups. Nonetheless,

the three factions were pro-government. An anti-government SWELA

also formed, as did another group led by Akpo Mukete, the YCPDM subsection

president for the Meme Division and the son of chief Mukete, the traditional

ruler of the Bafaw people, who believed that anybody could belong as

long as he or she contributed to development. This paper focuses on the progovernment

SWELA. According to Section 3 of its constitution, SWELA’s

objectives include:

• Promote unity and foster development among its members and the Southwest

Province in general.

• Promote the socioeconomic development of the Southwest Province in

line with government action.

• Provide assistance to deserving students of the Southwest Province in

educational institutions.

• Promote and preserve historical and literary works of the Southwest Province.

• Organize cultural activities so as to achieve the preservation of our cultural

heritage.

• Promote and encourage all activities likely to foster national unity.

From these, it becomes apparent that not everybody living in the Southwest

Province could automatically belong to SWELA, which by extension meant

was fully exploited by the government in the 1996 constitution. Moreover,

its structure revealed that its activities touched the nooks and crannies of the

Southwest Province, thereby actively involving the masses in its politicking. In

addition, while it is difficult to identify anything political about its objectives

For instance, SWELA was born in a political whirlwind, and was the

direct result of re-splintering and re-appropriating political space in English

Cameroon. The region now harboring SWELA was and is a colonial invention,

branded into various sections, such as the forest zone, Cameroon Province,

and the Southwest Province, by the British colonial administration and the postindependence

administration. The creation and activities of SWELA do not

make the elites monolithic; rather they are fighting for monopoly and hegemony

over the state. In doing so, differences have occurred at various levels, though

in general SWELA has become a supra-ethnic association.

Most literature on SWELA (e.g., Fochingong, 2004; Geschiere, 2001;

Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003; Nyamnjoh & Rowlands, 1998) has treated the

subject from a sociological or anthropological point of view. Those who

have written from a political science and/or historical point of view (Awasom,

2003; Fochingong, 2004) have not, in my opinion, placed enough

emphasis on how the government has been using SWELA and its antecedents.

The primary goal of this paper was to fill a gap in the historiography of

SWELA by limiting discussion to its historical antecedents while demonstrating

how this fits into ethno-regional politics and the invention of ethnicity in

Cameroon. Furthermore, this study attempts to reconstruct the nature and

dynamics of Cameroonian politics, especially in terms of elite intrigues and

manipulations, and critically appraise how the Biya government has been

manipulating SWELA and how SWELA (and its members) has been using the

government for its own gains.

ELITES: SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES AND DEBATES

This section examines some of the views posited by scholars on the concept

of elites and, an objective that is of critical importance, this study tests these

views against the elite peculiarities vis-à-vis SWELA. A clear-cut definition of

“elite” is very difficult to achieve and is, at times, controversial, despite its

common usage in everyday parlance. The idea of elites in Africa has attracted

much attention in academia, and there is an abundant literature on the topic

(e.g., Barongo, 1983; Buijtenhuijs, 1978; Korvenoja, 1993; Mboukou, 1981;

Mphahlele, 1959; Osaghae, 1991; van den Lindfors, 1974; Wallerstein, 1965;

Wamba-dia-Wamba, 1992). Although these scholars have not agreed on a single

definition, elites are generally considered those individuals who have a profound

influence on society and have therefore become prime players in societal systems.

Thus, this definition will be adopted for the analysis in this paper. Important

categories of elites include political, social, economic, traditional, and military,

but this paper is limited to the political and traditional elites.

The analysis presented here is based largely on a theory of Fernand Braudel.

Braudel (1969) proposed a two-layer model of historical time, comprising shortrun

time (temps court) and the longue durée. Instead of longue durée, however,

this paper adopts an historical antecedent to confirm that, before the formation

of SWELA, there had been another association, VIKUMA, which became

the primary force behind SWELA. The analysis herein is also informed by

Bottomore’s theory (Bottomore, 1976) of democracy and a plurality of elites.

Above all, this paper will employ what I call the center–periphery theory of

elites, based on the idea that differences between Yaounde elites (center) and

provincial elites (periphery) led to the break-up of SWELA.

ETHNO-REGIONAL RIVALRY AND SWELA’S ANTECEDENT (VIKUMA)

VIKUMA stands for Victoria, Kumba, and Mamfe, the three divisions

of the Cameroons under the British colonial administration (Kale,

1967). The origin of this pressure group can be traced back to 1959

when, in the heat of political campaigning, the Kamerun National

Congress (KNC), a party with its bastion in the forest zone, was toppled by

the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), based in the Bamenda grassland

zone. This was the handiwork of political and traditional elites in these

divisions. Aluko (2003) maintains that ethnic diversity has always been manipulated

for various reasons and purposes, ranging from individual or selfish ends,

to class (and other subgroup), communal sectional, and parochial interests.

VIKUMA was manipulated by elites for their own selfish gain.

The rise of Foncha as the leader of the KNDP and premier of British Southern

Cameroons in 1959 brought political victimization, tribalism, and nepotism

at the expense of the people from the forest zone and others not affiliated with

and/or regionalism of the Foncha government was intended to address

the demands of the people of the forest zone (Bakweri, Balong, Bakossi, and

Bayangs, among others) in the post-plebiscite discussions (March–April, 1961)

special U. N. commission for a period of three years” (Johnson, 1970). This ran

parallel to KNDP, which advocated reunification with the French Cameroons.

The proponents of this idea were politically elite individuals such as E. M. L.

Endeley, P. N. Motomby-Woleta, S. E. Ajebe-Sone, and N. N. Mbile. They were

nationalists during the decolonization period; additionally, it should be noted

that one of the problems of nationalists in West Africa, in general, was that “appeals

to traditional sentiments lead to micro-nationalism of units” (Hussain, 1973).

In a situation of political victimization and growing “graffiphobia” (the

word “Graffi” is used to describe individuals from the Bamenda grasslands of

milestone that initiated a process of ethnic formation that distinguished most

Southwesterners (forest zone) from Northwesterners (grassland zone). Henceforth,

Southwesterners were increasingly perceived as a people with natural territorial

and cultural boundaries. However, it also gave Southwesterners a sense

of common destiny, and launched a common front against “institutionalized”

discrimination.

As early as 11 October, 1963, before VIKUMA was even established, a meeting

was held in Dr. Endeley’s house; in attendance were Mbile, Henry Namata

Elangwe, D. B. Monyongo, and Ajebe-Sone, the political elite of the coastal

zone. They resolved to “fight so hard that the vice president [of the Federal

Republic] and the Prime Minister [of West Cameroon] should not all be from

the Bamenda grass field” (Ngoh, 1999).

VIKUMA was radical, and provided a forum for discussing problems of the

coastal people or forest zone. At the top of its agenda was the idea of freedom

from the “Bamenda oligarchy.” According to its founder, Walter Wilson,

the Bamenda people were not sincere about reunification, and had accepted

between 1949 and 1954 Southern Cameroons had two separate provinces: the

Cameroons Province, corresponding to the present-day Southwest Province,

and the Bamenda Province, presently the Northwest Province. When Southern

Cameroons was granted the status of an autonomous region in 1954, the

Bamenda people protested that they did not want the Bamenda Province to

be abolished (Kale, 1967). They argued that, with Dr. Endeley as leader of

governmental affairs, political power was in the hands of those from the

Cameroons Province, which in turn would make defending their own interests

difficult. As a compromise, the British opened a liaison office in Bamenda

to aid the Bamenda Province. Once Foncha broke away from the KNC and

formed the KNDP in 1955, the liaison office automatically disappeared, because

the Bamenda political elites did not feel threatened by Buea. VIKUMA was

formed, therefore, to fight for the same issues that the Bamenda people had

been fighting for between 1954 and 1959, when they were not in power.

VIKUMA, however, went further in that they advocated a territorial reorganization

of the Cameroon Federation on ethnic lines, regrouping the present Southwest

with the Littoral Provinces, and headquartering it in Kumba, as well as

Other than emphasizing the chauvinistic and jingoist attitudes of the

VIKUMA president, the foregoing sets out constructions of ethnicity by the

various ethnic elites. To say that the Bamenda people protested the autonomous

region of 1954 is largely an error with respect to Cameroon historiography

(Fanso, 1988; Johnson, 1970; Kale, 1967; Mbile, 2000; Ngoh, 2001). It

also shows that the conglomeration of the Grand SAWA movement, an ethnically-

related coastal elite of the Southwest and neighboring Francophone

Littoral Province, on the basis of common feelings of exploitation and domination

by grassland settlers in the 1990s, is something that had long been whispered

among VIKUMA members (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Above all, it

portrays in no small way the creation of ethnicity by the colonial administration

and the continuation of an appropriation of political space by the postcolonial

elites.

However, VIKUMA was dissolved in 1965 when its founder joined the

Cameroon United Congress (CUC) as publicity secretary. This was striking,

because the party was led by Solomon Tandeng Muna, who was from the

grassland region (Northwest). Perhaps the demise of VIKUMA fell in line with

historical trends that included an ambivalent perception of modernization as, on

the one hand, essentially destructive and alien and, on the other hand, a provider

of scarce beneficial resources (Yenshu, 1998). The coastal people were the

first to come in contact with the Europeans, and their attitudes towards modernization

have fluctuated, from collaboration when there were benefits to be

reaped to protest and opposition when it became invasive. Thus, VIKUMA

and SWELA were formed to protest the Bamenda hegemony, thereby inventing

an ethnic association. Whatever the case, VIKUMA’s politics created, first

and foremost, a keen sense of self-awareness within the present-day Southwest

Province. Second, it helped launch several subsequent elite associations, including

SWELA. Third, VIKUMA and SWELA were created to compete for scarce

resources, whether economic, social, or political, with kin from the Northwest.

The 1970–1980 decade was one of despair and disillusionment for the Southwest

elites, who claimed they had been marginalized. This feeling stemmed

from the fact that all prime ministers of West Cameroon succeeding E. M. L.

Endeley had been from the Bamenda grasslands (LeVine, 1965). In response,

the Southwest elites either blackmailed other Southwesterners to gain favors

from their francophone-dominated political masters, or remained silent while

began to form, as claimed by these political elites. To prevent this trend

developing further, a pressure group that would fight for the interests of the

Southwest became necessary. SWELA was born, therefore, in 1991 as a continuation

of VIKUMA, and as a re-appropriation of political space.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF SWELA

SWELA was born out of the desire by Southwest elites for collective leadership

that would articulate ethnic and provincial interests, both of which they

felt had become increasingly marginalized in political, economic, and social

domains. Most Southwesterners had come to realize that by pursuing Anglophone/

Francophone logic, the distribution of value within the system would not

favor them, for the Northwesterners were the dominant Anglophone group, and

and economic resources against the Northwest elite, who were in an advantageous

position as the majority group. The fact that they were not well represented

in the government, but provided much of the country’s resources (e.g.,

oil, rubber, bananas, palms, and tea) is similar to the situation of the Niger

Delta minorities in Nigeria (Isumonah, 2001).

The idea of an elite association was given an additional fillip with the election

of President Biya in 1982; this was part of the effort to create a propaganda

weapon on the part of the regime so that it could demonstrate popular

consensus and consolidate its power. In this light, a group of Southwest elites,

(headquarters of the Southwest Province) and Yaounde (capital of Cameroon)

signed motions of support for Biya during his conflict in 1983 with Ahidjo,

his predecessor (Fanso, 1988). The Biya–Ahidjo fracas was apparently sparked

when Ahidjo attempted to unseat Biya in a coup d’état, which was ultimately

prevented (Takougang & Krieger, 1998). After the fracas, Biya decided to test

his popularity by calling a snap presidential election in 1983. During the election,

Akoko, 2004)

The first major challenge that emphasized the necessity for a powerful

SWELA was the Pamol Plantation Du Cameroun (PAMOL) crisis. In

October 1987, it was rumored that PAMOL was to go on voluntary liquidation

(Nyamnjoh, 1997), and that a group of Northwest business magnates, namely

Daniel A. Nangah, Martin Che, and Wilie Nango Kimbeng, had tendered to

buy it. In response, a meeting of more than 60 Southwest elite individuals in

company, CAMAGRI, was asked to tender and compete on-the-spot, and

registered with shares of 50.000 francs (US$ 100 each). Two major players

involved in this effort were Minister Ogork Ntui, board member of PAMOL,

and Governor Enow Tanjong. The purchase of PAMOL, which Southwesterners

viewed as tantamount to mortgaging most of the fertile lands of Ndian and

even rendering some 6,000 Southwesterners unemployed, rekindled the concerns

of Southwest elites.

But what helped galvanize the coming together of the Southwest political

icons were two outstanding events that occurred in 1988. First, the death of

veteran politician E. M. L. Endeley took place; this was followed by the resignation

of Solomon Tandeng Muna, speaker of the National Assembly (Ngoh,

1987). The death of Endeley was a great loss for the Southwest elites, who

were aware of the great vacuum he had left behind, and of the fact that there

was no-one in the province who could fill that gap. Consequently, there was a

need for a pressure group to provide collective leadership in the absence of any

respectable Southwest spokesman.

The resignation of Muna was even more serious than the death of Endeley,

because the Southwesterners had been planning on the basis of him being the

speaker of the National Assembly. They had even held, rightly or wrongly, that

W. N. O. Effiom or Thomas Ebongalame, old and experienced politicians of

Achidi Achu and Joseph Awunti, from Mezam, and former vice minister

of agriculture and minister, in charge of parliamentary relations. Whether

by design, accident, or political expediency, Biya then appointed Fonka Shang

Lawrence, from the Northwest Province. This appointment either demonstrated

how impotent the Southwest lobbying group was, or Biya’s lack of faith in

them. It further pointed to the fact that the Southwest elite individuals residing

in the capital of Yaounde showed little tact when it came to defending the position

of the Southwest Province. The appointment also aggravated the conflicted

relations of Southwesterners over state resources in relation to Northwesterners.

The appointment of Fonka, in any case, showed the Southwest elites that it was

In 1989, with increased political tension following the end of the Cold War,

a wind of change blew across Cameroon, leading to widespread student riots in

the differences between the Northwest and Southwest became clearer. The creation

of the University of Buea helped give birth to SWELA. In fact, immediately

following its establishment, a group of Southwest elites residing in

Yaounde, led by Yaounde University Vice Chancellor Dr. Peter Agbor Tabi, sent

a motion of thanks to the government of Paul Biya. Suspicious that the Northwest

elites might attempt to decentralize the new university for their own benefit,

Tabi’s group, called SWEG, held a series of meetings and sent a memorandum

to the Minister of Higher Education condemning any moves for decentralization.

The birth of SWELA had thus begun.

THE BIRTH OF SWELA

SWELA was fostered into existence primarily by five prominent Southwesterners,

namely, David M. Iyok, Barrister Abraham T. Enaw, and chiefs

Emmanuel Tabe Egbe, Ephraim Inoni, and Fomenky. Their power lay in the

fact that most had already been working with the government in at least a ministerial

role. The exception was David M. Iyok, who was a financial baron and

founding manager of a paper company (SAMCO). Moreover, some had gone

by traditional titles, such as chief, which, by implication, meant that they were

custodians of culture and of the people. It was at Chief Egbe’s house that

these prominent Southwest elite individuals, and others such as Iyok, organized

as a single entity to address the issue of the University of Buea. Then, on 25

May 1991, the Southwest Elite Forum summoned another meeting in Victoria

Hall that laid the foundation of SWELA. Jointly organized by Chief Inoni and

Limbe Urban Council Mayor Dan Matute, it brought together 38 people, drawn

Although this meeting had no defined agenda, Chief Inoni emphasized the

necessity to unite and speak with one voice to solidify the strategic position of

the Southwest Province and fight for its interests. In this way, he helped bridge

Yaounde to the provincial forces of SWELA. One week later, another meeting

took place (31 May 1991), attended by 99 retired “sons of the soil,” including

Mola Njoh Litumbe and former ambassador Fossung. The aim of the meeting

was to identify the major problems of the province, and its importance lay in

the fact that it dispatched a six-man delegation to the All Anglophone Conference

held in Buea, 3–6 June 1991.

D. M. Iyok also played a very important role in the establishment of

SWELA. He helped give the forum a provincial dimension, and acted more

or less as the propaganda hub through which all patrons and elders were contacted.

Moreover, he sensitized many others, including barristers Nkongho

and Chief Tabetando in Douala, and Chief Fomenky, Chief Raymond Beseka,

provincial association. Furthermore, he largely organized the next crucial meeting,

which took place on 8 June in Kumba.

The Kumba meeting brought together some 300 people, and essentially

served as the inaugural meeting of SWELA. Lawyer A. T. Enaw chaired the

meeting, and S. N. Dioh was Vice Chairman. Lawyer Edjua proposed the name

of Southwest Elites Association, and a constitutional draft committee was created,

consisting of lawyer Eseme, justice Bawak, and S. N. Dioh.

Another meeting in Limbe (6 July, 1991), which attracted a crowd of 1,500

people, closely followed the Kumba meeting. The issues of membership of the

officially registered in conformity with law No. 90–153 with the Senior Divisional

Officer of Kumba. Kumba thus became the birthplace of SWELA. On

21 August 1991, the association was recognized and legitimized by the indigenes

of the Southwest province. Thus SWELA was established in a context of

ethnic, civil, economic, political, and social marginalization for the Southwest

Province. Its future was uncertain.

INTERNAL WRANGLING WITHIN SWELA

In contrast to the euphoria and conviviality at the inception of SWELA, it

was greeted with suspicion and obstruction both within and outside the province.

The first major problem that confronted SWELA was that of the relationship

between the Yaounde Southwest Elites and those based in the province. As

previously mentioned, Dr. Endeley had succeeded in providing leadership from

the province (not Yaounde). The creation of SWELA signified a rejection of the

Yaounde elites, who were accused of not addressing the interests of the Southwest

people. Henceforth, Southwest interests were to be articulated from the

province, and not Yaounde.

This rift between the provincial and Yaounde elites manifested in late

September, 1991, during President Biya’s visit to the Southwest Province. The

presidential protocol reserved some 100 invitations for SWELA. Unfortunately,

all were withheld by a Southwest minister who never delivered them to the

The second conflict arose when a SWELA delegation comprising Abraham

T. Enaw, lawyer Edjua, Nnoko Mbele, and Dr. George Atem were prevented

by Southwest minister Benjamin Itoe from having an audience with the president

elite would attempt to hijack the association for their own ends. The words

of SWELA Secretary General A. T. Enaw, spoken at the Mamfe conference

(December 1991), clearly sums up the situation:

The visit of the Head of State to the Southwest Province on 27 and

28 September 1991 has now become history but there are lessons to

be learnt by all members of SWELA. The first problem of determination

is where is the seat of SWELA located? Is it located in Yaounde

the national capital of the Republic of Cameroon or is it located in the

South West Province.… Let no man or group of people give the impression

that SWELA is under their armpit and they control it through a

remote control (See note 17).

The tussle in SWELA had started, arising primarily out of competition with

the state over resources. The conflict was mainly political because, to a large

extent, Yaounde was the seat of government and the Yaounde elite felt that they

should control SWELA. It should be noted that factional struggle within a pressure

group and/or party, such as that which took place in the Kenyan African

National Union between 1969 and 1996 (Buijtenhuijs, 1978), is common. This

competition illustrates what I call center-periphery theory, or vertical competition

among elites, which is simply the struggle between elites in the center and

those on the periphery (i.e., in the provinces).

The second major challenge, which permanently fractured SWELA, stemmed

from the newly created Southwest Chiefs Conference (SWECC). Its members

were custodians of the people, and most of them (e.g., Mukete, Endeley,

Elangwe, Molongwe, Arrey, and Manga) had been active politicians. They considered

themselves core elites; most represented conservative ideals, and all

were staunch members of the ruling party, the Cameroon People’s Democratic

Movement (CPDM). Including them in SWELA, with special roles as national

executives and advisers at chapters and branches, transformed these traditional

elites into political elites, and marked the beginning of SWELA’s decomposition.

The differences that occurred within SWELA illustrate, in concrete terms,

inter-elite competition stemming from a political elite’s desire to identify with

Such situations are more acute in impoverished regions, because poverty often

drives the ambition and activities of elites (Barongo, 1983).

Compounding SWELA’s problems was the general perception that it was a

xenophobic association aimed at containing the settler population, which was

mostly from the Northwest Province (Delancey, 1974). However, it also incurred

some basis for this, and it appeared to accord with the intentions of the government

in that some of the French Cameroonians who had settled in the

Southwest Province long before had been refused membership to the association

(Geschiere, 2001). This conflict over the political center was a major force

leading to the split of SWELA. However, other factors were equally important.

First, Cameroon is made up of more than 250 ethnic groups, and SWELA

included Orocko, Bayangi, Bakweri, Bangwa, Bassosi, Bakossi, Bafaw, Balong,

and Mbo, with six administrative divisions. Although SWELA was a supraethnic

association, it nonetheless had individual indigenes that fought for their

own specific group’s interests. Second, SWELA was born in a political whirlwind

by politically hungry leaders, many of whom intended to use it as a

shield for their own political ends. In the heat of that multiparty tempest, and

from within SWELA, emerged opposition leaders as well as those of the ruling

government. The differences became acute, contributing to its eventual fragmentation.

Third, the nuances between traditionally educated elites and politicians

to be superior and saw SWELA as an arm of SWECC. Finally, the organization

put into place the “derivative policy,” which meant that the more a region

contributes to national development in terms of natural resources, the more it

is rewarded in terms of development. However, in practice, some regions contributed

more resources but were not rewarded while others contributed less but

were rewarded. Consequently, the elites from regions that contributed more but

received less felt slighted, and such sentiments fragmented SWELA.

SWELA GOES PLURAL

The first step towards the plurality of SWELA took place in 1992, before

its 1993 split, during the general assembly meeting in Mudemba, Ndian division,

the development of the South West Province as its pre-occupation as a condition

showed any interest in the development of the Southwest Province, then

SWELA was going to show unalloyed loyalty and vice versa. This did not go

unnoticed by smart politicians, who exploited the opportunity.

The opportune moment came with the death of SWELA’s Secretary General,

“the military brutalities in the South West Province during the 1993 government

anti-smuggling campaign led to a split in SWELA.” While not overtly rejecting

this notion, the death of the Secretary General may have had more to do with

the split than the anti-smuggling campaign, because through that death a power

vacuum was created.

Martin Nkemngu, who was vice secretary general, thought he was constitutionally

granted the right to fill the space, pending future elections. However,

Nnoko Mbelle did not consider Nkemngu a true Southwesterner, even though

he was Bafaw, a prominent ethnic group in the Southwest Province and was in

close contact with the Yaounde elites. The general assembly in Menji, Lebialem

division, on December, 1993, provided the occasion for Nnoko Mbelle to boycott

it, alongside his supporters, calling it illegal. He went ahead to form his

own faction.

Nnoko Mbelle’s opinion that Nkemngu was not a true Southwesterner

stemmed from the fact that the former belonged to the Social Democratic Front

(SDF), an opposition party with a strong following in the Northwest and Western

Provinces. Secondly, Nkemngu comes from the Lebialem division, which

is halfway into the grasslands and the forest zone. Thus, Mbelle felt that

Nkemngu had never been generally elected. It was in this environment that

SWELA suffered a split, with Mbelle heading a faction. Although he was taken

to court several times, all such efforts was as effective as a “storm in a tea

Nnoko Mbelle’s faction of SWELA had highly-placed CPDM agents, and was

thus called a pro-government SWELA, or SWELA II, given that there is no

clear-cut distinction between the party and the state in Cameroon. These highlevel

CPDM members included Emmanuel Tabi Egbe (Roving Ambassador),

Peter Agbor Tabi (Minister of Higher Education), John Ebong Ngolle (Minister),

Ephraim Inoni (Minister), and Caven Nnoko Mbelle (Secretary General). There

were also prominent Southwest chiefs, such as Mola Samuel Endeley and Nfon

the wall; SWELA had gone plural, and the government had penetrated its fabric.

The governor of the Southwest Province, Peter Oben Ashu, was one of the

first to identify with the pro-government SWELA, because of his CPDM’s leanings.

He began by giving his blessings to the executive, and promised to grant

their request to hold their general assembly in Kumba, but remarked that “these

him with assurances that they would reverse the disastrous fortunes of the ruling

CPDM in the coming elections by capturing councils for the CPDM in

the Southwest Province. He regretted the fact that the CPDM had a very poor

standing in the province.

Reacting to Governor Peter Oben Ashu’s attendance at the “illegal” SWELA

meeting in Kumba, Peter Agbor Tabi remarked that:

It is unfortunate that we are in a country where on the one hand the

governor expects state institutions to be respected, and on the other hand,

he deliberately supports a recalcitrant individual in breaking the law. This

is an unfortunate situation, which we see as double standards, and I do

27)

It is difficult to accept Tabi’s position, given that he too was in the government

and at the same time a member of SWELA. Perhaps he was just playing

the role of Pontius Pilatus.

The SWELA II faction executive, however, accepted the governor’s condition,

promising to contribute 16 million francs (US$ 35,000) to sponsor the

CPDM campaign in the Province at the upcoming elections. As a mark of further

assurance of the SWELA II acceptance to support the CPDM election campaign,

the creation of action committees was discussed, with one of them called

the “committee of strategy.” What had become clear was that SWELA had

Yet the members of SWELA were also expecting to gain from the government.

They started seeing benefits following the 1996 municipal elections, in which

Nnoko Mbelle was appointed the government delegate for Kumba urban council.

His rival, Martin Nkemngu, was placed on a ‘punitive’ transfer to Yaounde

as an ordinary member of staff of CAMNEWS. This was essentially a punishment,

because he had formerly been the head of CAMNEWS in Buea

(Geschiere, 2001). However, this point is still debatable, because the act of

transferring civil servants in Cameroon is a government action.

The Yaounde-based pro-government SWELA faction also suffered a rumpus,

over the admission of Southwest candidates into Ecole Normale Supérieure

entitled to 10 places in the ENS, with the Manyu division having 26 extra

seats, because the Minister of Higher Education, Peter Agbor Tabi, came

from that division. The list was arranged and handed over to Chief Ephraim

Inoni, Assistant Secretary General at the presidency; John Ebong Ngolle,

Minister for Special Duties at the Presidency; and Peter Agbor Tabi, who was

to be the final arbiter of the list. Much to the chagrin of these elites, out of 83

candidates from the Southwest, only 10 came from their list. This was particularly

unusual, because the ENS had been established to train professional teachers,

who were admitted on merit alone. But because the Minister of Higher

Education belonged to the Yaounde SWELA, the political elites of the province

wanted to make a fortune out of this prestigious institution by grabbing more

state resources for it.

This intra-elite competition stemmed from conflict over who would gain access

to a greater share of state resources. Peter Agbor Tabi, who had been promoted

from Vice Chancellor of Yaounde University to the Minister of Higher Education,

was held responsible for letting down the Southwest Province with respect

to the utilization of state resources. Whatever the case, the pro-government

SWELA never failed to support the government during election campaigns.

THE FORTUNES OF SWELA

The political campaigns of the pro-government SWELA were at times direct

and at times indirect. Regardless of their technique, what became clear was that

most citizens did not exercise their civic responsibility. When Governor Peter

Oben Ashu gave his blessings to the ‘rebel’ faction of SWELA, it was on condition

that they would help redress the poor CPDM situation in the Southwest

Province. The SWELA II group responded positively, promising to contribute 16

million francs to sponsor the CPDM campaigns in the province at the upcoming

council elections. This constituted a tacit entente between pro-government

SWELA and the government, and it demonstrated that the latter was dedicated

to campaigning.

After being appointed Prime Minister of Cameroon in 1996, Peter Mafany

Musonge’s words at his reception left nothing in doubt. Amongst other things,

he said, “Biya has scratched our back and we shall certainly scratch the Head

2003). Musonge was emphasizing that Biya should be rewarded abundantly during

the next elections for appointing him Prime Minister, an appointment the

Southwest had not experienced since 1958. Assistant Secretary General of the

pro-government SWELA, Norbert Nangiy Mbile, also used the appointment of

Musonge to campaign: “Therefore he [Musonge] has to be assured of the support

of all South Westerners. The support has to be oral, total and convincingly

expressed in the forthcoming elections. Only then can we expect him to deliver

On 12 March 1997, SWECC Secretary General Atem Ebako called upon

Southwesterners to support the ruling party in the forthcoming parliamentary